This paper presents a filtering model of the housing market which is similar to Sweeney's (1974b) , except that the maintenance technology is such that housing can be maintained at a constant quality level as well as downgraded, and population at each income level grows continuously over time. In equilibrium, at each moment of time, some housing is allowed to deteriorate in quality, and other housing is maintained in a steady-state interval of qualities.
A Filtering Model with Steady-State Housing
Over the past twenty years, housing economic theorists have been elaborating a filtering view of the housing market that focuses on quality differentiation and durability. There was earlier work on filtering --Grigsby (1963) , Lowry (1960) , papers in the housing services tradition which treated quality-differentiated submarkets, and an extensive, discursive policy literature. But the seminal papers by Sweeney (1974a,b) were the first to formalize the view and to put it into a general equilibrium context. In the Sweeney model, housing is constructed over an interval of higher qualities. After construction, a housing unit deteriorates in quality at a rate which depends on the level of maintenance expenditures, until it is eventually abandoned. At each point in time, there is a given stock of housing units by quality, and bidding among households determines the temporary equilibrium rent function, which gives the rent on a housing unit as a function of quality. Based on the current and future anticipated rent function, as well as the maintenance technology, landlords decide how much to spend on maintenance of their current units. A housing unit's market value equals the present discounted value of rents net of profit-maximizing maintenance expenditures. And at each point in time, a landlord spends on the maintenance of a housing unit up to the point where the last dollar spent on maintenance increases the unit's value by one dollar. The volume of construction over the construction quality interval is such that the market value of constructed housing equals the corresponding construction cost.
Finally, a housing unit is abandoned when its net rent falls to zero. For reasons of tractability, Sweeney (1974a,b) and all subsequent analytical filtering models have focused on the stationary state, but the models can be solved numerically to examine the nonstationary dynamics of the housing market, as is done in the Anas-Arnott simulation models (1991, 1993, and 1994 ).
There is no dispute concerning the value of Sweeney's broad conceptualization. Indeed, most cutting-edge housing policy analysis, such as O'Flaherty's work on homelessness (1993b) and abandonment (1993a), Rothenberg et al.' s recent book on urban housing markets (1991), and Anas and Arnott's policy simulation models, employs the Sweeney framework. But there has been dissatisfaction with some of the details of Sweeney's model: its specification of the maintenance technology, which assumes that a housing unit is doomed to deteriorate in quality and that the rate of deterioration depends on quality and maintenance expenditures but not on age; its aspatial nature; and its treatment of floor area and locational differentiation as attributes of a single quality variable --is it appropriate to treat a squalid tenement in a slum and a comfortable house in exurbia, which command the same rent, as identical in quality? Unfortunately, any model which were to address all these criticisms would be analytically intractable. As a result, the theoretical literature evolving from Sweeney has explored the implications of modifying specific assumptions.
One of the principal sources of dissatisfaction with the Sweeney model is its assumption that housing deteriorates in quality, however much is spent on maintenance. Sweeney's assumption may have seemed appropriate for California in the early seventies. But in many older cities, in the late seventies and in the eighties, as much was spent on rehabilitation/upgrading as on new construction. Relatedly, the amount of housing abandoned or demolished is considerably less than that which would be predicted by the Sweeney model.
One explanation is that the maintenance/upgrading technology and the economic environment are such that holding a housing unit's quality constant or rehabbing low-quality housing is more profitable than demolition/abandonment. 1 This paper explores a model that is essentially identical to Sweeney's (it employs Braid's (1984) continuum reformulation of Sweeney's discrete model), except that the maintenance technology is modified to permit the possibility that housing may be upgraded or maintained at constant quality.
Sections 2-4 provide a comparison of the economic behavior of the Sweeney model with that of related models in the literature, including the model of this paper. Sections 5 and 6 are more technical, describing precisely how equilibrium in our model is solved for. Section 5 describes short-run equilibrium in the model --how the temporary equilibrium rent function is determined. Section 6 describes the supply side of the model --the maintenance and construction technologies --and provides a complete characterization of long-run equilibrium. Section 7 provides an extended algebraic example. Section 8 presents a numerical simulation example and a comparative static example based on Section 7. Sections 9 and 10 discuss extensions of the model and make concluding remarks.
The Arnott-Davidson-Pines Model
Sections 2-4 discuss the economics of the landlord's problem under alternative specifications of the maintenance technology. The discussion is somewhat casual. A more formal treatment of the model presented in the paper is presented in Sections 5 and 6.
A useful place to start is a simplified version of the landlord's problem treated in Arnott, Davidson, and Pines (1983) --ADP hereafter. A landlordbuilder constructs a durable housing unit at a particular quality level. The housing unit deteriorates at a speed (possibly negative) depending on the level of maintenance expenditures. Taking the rent function as given, the landlord-builder chooses construction quality and maintenance expenditures over the life of the building so as to maximize the discounted present value of profit from the unit. The economic environment is stationary and there is no space. Hence, where t is housing unit age, q is quality, q 0 construction quality, q T terminal quality, T terminal time, p q ( ) the rent function, m maintenance expenditures, r the discount rate, ρ the construction price of a unit of quality, and Π the discounted present value of profits, the landlord's problem is 
The maintenance technology is characterized by 2 q = g q,m ( ). As in Sweeney's (1974b) paper, it is assumed for simplification that a unit's depreciation does not depend explicitly on the unit's age. In contrast to Sweeney's specification, however, the technology permits both upgrading and downgrading.
This is an optimal control problem with a single control variable, m , and a single state variable, q . Also, time enters the problem directly only via the discount factor. The solution procedure for this type of problem is wellknown; see, for example, Kamien and Schwartz (1981, Part II, section 8) . Set up the current-value Hamiltonian. From the first-order condition with respect to the control variable, determine the optimal value of the control variable as a function of the state and co-state variables. Then solve for the equations of motion for the state and co-state variables as functions of only the state and co-state variables, which permits phase-plane analysis. The optimal trajectory satisfies these equations of motion, and must also satisfy the relevant initial and terminal conditions.
The current-value Hamiltonian is
where φ is the current-value co-state variable associated with constraint ii) and is interpreted as the marginal value of quality. The first-order condition with respect to maintenance is
This states that the optimal level of maintenance occurs where the marginal cost equals the marginal revenue, unless marginal cost exceeds marginal revenue at zero maintenance in which case zero maintenance is optimal.
Since the second-order condition is satisfied, this yields m = m q,φ ( ). The current-value Hamiltonian with maintenance substituted in, the maximized current-value Hamiltonian, is
( 4 )
The equation of motion for the state variable is
and for the co-state variable is
Housing unit quality at t = 0 is a choice variable. On the assumption that profit-maximizing construction quality is non-zero, the initial condition is
which states that construction quality should be carried to the point where the marginal cost of an extra unit of quality via construction, ρ , equals the marginal revenue --the marginal value of quality. Phase-plane analysis provides a neat way to combine the optimality conditions in order to determine the optimal trajectory. The qualitative properties of the optimal solution depend on the configuration of the phase plane. Here we shall consider only the normal case (we shall explain why this is the normal case subsequently) in which the q = 0 locus is upward-sloping, the φ = 0 locus is downward-sloping, and the two curves intersect at S (the saddlepoint) above the φ = ρ line. This is the configuration depicted in Figure  1 . In this situation, there are two qualitatively different profit-maximizing strategies for the landlord. In the first, after construction the landlord lets the unit's quality deteriorate until eventual abandonment; in the second, after construction the landlord lets the unit's quality run down until it falls to a critical quality at which it is maintained forever.
INSERT FIGURE 1
The optimal abandonment trajectory is shown as BCDE in Figure 1 . It starts on φ = ρ, satisfies the equations of motion, and ends up where 
The second point is that if H > 0 where the unstable arm intersects the q -or φ -axis, F , there is no optimal abandonment trajectory. The value of the Hamiltonian is greater 3 at E than at
, which is inconsistent with an optimal abandonment trajectory.
The optimal non-abandonment trajectory is AS. The proof follows that in ADP and entails demonstrating that AS is the most profitable infinite horizon program.
If the optimal abandonment trajectory exists, it is more profitable than the optimal non-abandonment trajectory. To demonstrate this, it needs to be shown that
Thus, if the optimal abandonment trajectory exists, it is the optimal trajectory, while if the optimal abandonment trajectory does not exist, the optimal non-abandonment trajectory is optimal.
We now provide an economic interpretation of the "normal case" and of the optimal solution. The q = 0 locus is the landlord's static supply curve. Consider a point ′ q , ′ φ ( ) on this curve. Given ′ φ , ′ q is that level of quality such that with profit-maximizing maintenance expenditures, quality remains constant. Correspondingly, the φ = 0 locus is the landlord's static demand 3 Suppose F is on the q -axis. Since E lies to the right of F on the q -axis and since
Suppose F and E are on the φ -axis.
Then since H φ =q , on the φ -axis, H E ( ) > H F ( ). Suppose F is on the q -axis and E on the The assumption that the q = 0 locus is upward-sloping is technological. Suppose that g qm = 0. Then (see Appendix 1) the assumption reduces to the assumption that the technology is such that more needs to be spent on maintenance to hold a unit's quality constant, the higher the quality of the unit. With g qm ≠ 0, the interpretation is slightly more complicated. The assumption that the φ = 0 locus is downward-sloping reflects the characteristics of both demand and technology. The assumption holds under reasonable conditions (see Appendix 1).
The assumption that the q = 0 locus and the φ = 0 locus intersect above the φ = ρ locus implies that the marginal cost of quality via maintenance in the stationary state exceeds the marginal cost of quality via construction. To see the import of this assumption, suppose that it does not hold. Then we have the situation shown in Figure 2 . After initial construction at zero (the paths ZS or ′′ Z Y ) or positive ′ Z S ( ) quality, the unit would either be upgraded to stationary-state quality or upgraded and then downgraded. Since, in fact, housing units are almost invariably downgraded immediately after construction, the configuration shown in Fig. 2 is empirically implausible.
INSERT FIGURE 2
Finally, with the configuration shown in Figure 1 , we can provide an economic interpretation of the condition that the landlord will eventually abandon the housing unit if H < 0 where the unstable arm intersects the q -or φ -axis, and will not abandon it otherwise. Now, H = p q We now present a phase diagram analysis of Sweeney-type models (Sweeney (1974) , Ohls (1975) , Braid (1984) ), which has not previously been function, and use it as the rent function for the next iteration. This procedure, or an adaptation of it, will converge to the equilibrium rent function.
INSERT FIGURE 3A
We now briefly consider the circumstances under which construction will occur at only one quality level, which under Sweeney's assumptions is the top-quality housing in the market. Suppose that we have solved for the equilibrium per the above procedure. Associated with this equilibrium is a housing value function, V q
. By construction, V q 0 ( ) = ρq 0 . A necessary and sufficient condition for this equilibrium, which is conditional on construction at a single quality, to be a full equilibrium is that, at all quality levels, housing value not exceed construction costs. Intuitively, if the income distribution has a right-side tail, a construction interval is to be expected.
Market equilibrium is efficient. With a right-side tail, it is efficient that the richest person live in a palace, but not that everyone live in hand-me-down palaces. In Section 9, we shall return to this issue.
The phase diagram for the situation where construction occurs over an interval of qualities is shown in Figure 3b . We will argue that the optimal trajectory for a housing unit starts somewhere between ′ B and B , goes to B , and then follows the path BCDE . The construction interval is q 0 ,q 0 ( ) . The landlord-builder must be indifferent concerning the quality at which he constructs in the interval. Hence, the optimal trajectory must coincide with φ = ρ throughout this interval, which implies that the φ = 0 locus must coincide with φ = ρ throughout this interval. Thus, along the optimal trajectory over the construction interval using (6) , dφ a dq = 0, and φ = ρ) which implies that
Thus, over the construction interval, the slope of the rent gradient is supplydetermined, depending on the construction and maintenance technologies but not on tastes or the distribution of income. Construction volume by quality over the interval must be such that (8) is satisfied over the construction interval and zero profits are made.
INSERT FIGURE 3B
To determine the behavior of φ = 0 just below B and just above ′ B requires more subtle arguments. First, the value of a housing unit must be less than construction costs outside the construction interval. Now, where V q ( ) denotes the value of housing as a function of quality along the optimal trajectory,
which confirms the interpretation of φ as the marginal value of quality. Thus, along the optimal trajectory, φ > ρ for q immediately below q 0 , and φ < ρ for q immediately above q 0 . This requires that φ > 0 for q immediately below q 0 and immediately above q 0 . Second, the φ = 0 line is continuous at B and ′ B . Define MRS q, y − p ( ) to be the marginal rate of substitution between quality and other goods for a household with income net of rent y − p , and let y = y q ( ) be the function which matches households by income to housing units by quality. Since the rent function is the envelope of the equilibrium bid-rent functions,
Where G y ( ) gives the number of households with income above y and H q ( ) the number of housing units of quality above q , y q ( ) is given implicitly by 
These results imply that the φ = 0 line must have the configuration shown in Figure 3b , which implies that the optimal trajectory must have the shape shown.
Some derivative of φ = 0 must be discontinuous at B and at ′ B . We first explore the implication of a slope discontinuity for φ = 0 at A under the simplifying assumption that g qm = 0. Since
under this assumption, the discontinuity must enter via ′′ p . Furthermore, since r − g q > 0 along φ = 0 , ′′ p must discontinuously decrease as q increases across q 0 and again as q increases across q 0 . Now, define h q
( ) , and from (10)
Since MRS q , MRS y , and 
Since υ . Thus, we have demonstrated that, if φ = 0 has a slope discontinuity at A, there must be a construction bulge at q 0 . We have not proved that φ = 0 must have a slope discontinuity at A, though we suspect this is generally the case. One item of evidence in support of this conjecture is that the single paper which has numerically solved the Sweeney model with a construction interval (Ohls (1975) ) found a construction bulge.
The behavior of φ = 0 at ′ A is easier to analyze. Beyond q 0 the rent function coincides with the equilibrium bid-rent function of the richest household. Thus, from (10)
With a slope discontinuity in φ = 0 at ′ A , ′′ p must decrease discontinuously as q increases across q 0 . Thus, from (14), lim Here we shall provide only a heuristic presentation of our model. In the next section, we provide a thorough analysis.
In our model, the q = 0 locus is horizontal at φ = α and lies above the In cases III and IV, if the environment were stationary, all housing would be maintained at constant quality, and the analysis would be rather uninteresting. To make it more interesting, we assume that the population is growing at a constant rate which ensures that construction will occur.
The phase planes for the four cases are displayed in Figure 5 . Case I is essentially the same as Sweeney's model with a single construction quality. It is possible to maintain housing at constant quality, in contrast to Sweeney, but it is unprofitably expensive to do so. Case II is essentially the same as Sweeney's model with a single construction interval. Again, maintaining housing at constant quality is possible but unprofitably expensive.
Case III is similar to the ADP model where housing is upgraded to a stationary quality. There is, however, an important difference. In ADP, there was a single stationary quality. Here, in contrast, there is a range of stationary qualities. Upon reflection, this is not surprising. The housing market is efficient, and it is efficient to house households with different incomes in different qualities of housing, whether that housing is being downgraded or maintained at constant quality. In this case, the optimal trajectory for a housing unit follows the path AS, and the housing unit then spends the rest of its life in the interval S ′ S .
Case IV is similar to Case III except that construction occurs over a quality interval. In this case, the optimal trajectory for a housing unit starts somewhere between ′ A and A, goes to A, follows the path AS, and the housing unit then spends the rest of its life in the interval S ′ S .
INSERT FIGURE 5
In contrast to the continual downgrading assumed in the Sweeney model, what one tends to observe in European cities and cities in the northeastern U.S. is downgrading followed by rehabilitation cycles. In cases III and IV, landlords are indifferent concerning maintaining their housing anywhere between qualities q 1 and q 2 .. Thus, the model is consistent with a rehabilitation cycle, whereby units are downgraded to quality q 1 and then upgraded to quality q 2 via rehabilitation. This is overinterpreting an indeterminacy, but does suggest that only a slight perturbation of the model can generate a rehabilitation cycle. Let us suppose that it is possible to rehab upwards from quality ′ q to ′′ q at a cost of χ per unit of quality, where α > χ > ρ . This possibility is shown in Figure 6 , which is drawn so that eventually following a rehab-downgrading cycle is more profitable than either eventually abandoning the unit or eventually holding its quality constant. The optimal program entails running down the building from q 0 to ′ q , along the path WXY , then rehabbing from ′ q to ′′ q , then following the path ZXY , rehabbing again, etc. The optimal path entails the equal areas 
INSERT FIGURE 6
In the subsequent sections, we shall focus on case III, which entails construction at a single quality, downgrading to the steady-state quality interval, and then maintaining the housing in that interval. We shall solve for the equilibrium by providing a solution algorithm, on the assumption that equilibrium is of this form.
We have given only brief thought to issues of existence and uniqueness of equilibrium. The model differs in five essential ways from the ArrowDebreu model. First, there is a continuum of households. Second, there is a continuum of housing goods, differentiated by quality. Third, households are constrained to choosing a single housing good; one can say that either tastes or the consumption-possibility set is nonconvex. Fourth, households are constrained to choosing a single unit of the housing good, which introduces indivisibilities into the consumption set. And fifth, there are two technologies for the production of quality --construction and maintenance. While each of the technologies by itself is convex, the two in combination may lead to a nonconvex production set. There are general existence theorems for models which contain some of these ingredients, but none for models which contain all these departures from the Arrow-Debreu model. Since the model's structure is so particular, the most promising approach is probably to develop an ad hoc, constructive proof of existence of equilibrium. Our intuition suggests to us that equilibrium always exists and, with reasonable restrictions on tastes, is unique.
Short-Run Demand-Side Equilibrium
In this section and in Section 6, we solve for equilibrium in our housing model. Recall that our model is very similar to a continuum version of the Sweeney model, except that, instead of being downgraded and then abandoned, housing is downgraded to an interval of qualities where it is maintained forever. To simplify, we focus on the case where construction occurs at a single quality level.
This section describes short-run demand-side equilibrium in the model --how the rent function is determined, given a distribution of households by income and housing units by quality. The next section constructively solves for long-run equilibrium in the model.
The problem here, and its solution, are familiar from Braid (1981) .
Housing units differ only in quality (one may imagine floor area to be fixed) and households vary only in income. There is a given distribution of households by income, and a given distribution of housing units by quality.
The market matches households to housing units via adjustment of the rent function. Tastes are such that higher-income households obtain higherquality units.
The cumulative distribution function of income (measured backwards), and q 3 are exogenous; in later sections, they will be endogenous.
Households are perfectly matched to housing units in rank order.
Thus the i th highest income household lives in the i th highest quality housing unit, down to the poorest (N th richest) household which lives in the N th highest quality housing unit. We define y q ( ) to represent occupant income as a function of housing quality. The perfect matching condition can be written
Differentiating (15), it is seen that
Then
and
The utility function common to all consumers, U x,q ( ), depends on housing quality, q , and a numeraire non-housing good, x . Tastes are such
> 0 --the marginal valuation of quality increases with income --which ensures that higher-income households consume higher-quality housing in equilibrium. We term this the "normality condition." A consumer of income y maximizes utility subject to his budget constraint, y = x + p q ( ), where p q ( ) is the rent function relating rent to housing quality. The firstorder condition is −U x ′ p + U q = 0, which states that the marginal rate of substitution between quality and other goods equals the marginal rent of quality. Equilibrium requires that p q ( ) adjust so that this condition hold for all households. Thus,
Eq. (15) matches households to housing units, and (19) specifies that the slope of the rent function at each q equals the marginal rate of substitution between housing quality and other goods for the household occupying housing of that quality.
Equations (15) and (19) determine equilibrium only up to a constant of integration. In many Sweeney-type housing models without land, such as Braid (1981 Braid ( , 1984 Braid ( , 1986 , Ohls (1975) , Robson (1982) , and Sweeney (1974) , competition from unoccupied units just below the minimum occupied quality, q 1 , forces p q 1 ( ) = 0 (assuming operating costs to be zero). Like those models, the model of this paper has no land, but unlike those models there are no unoccupied housing units. The constant of integration is determined from the condition that the value of housing at the construction quality equals the corresponding construction cost, as shown in Section 6.
Long-Run Supply-Side Equilibrium Conditions
Since no housing is demolished, in a stationary state there would be no construction. And without construction, construction costs do not tie down rents. Thus, we assume a steady state in which population and all other quantities are growing at a constant rate n and prices remain constant over time. In the remainder of this paper, G y
and N are understood to be the values at time 0. We normalize such that today's ( t = 0) population and housing stock equals N .
Determining long-run equilibrium is something of a jigsaw puzzle. It will therefore be useful to set out the solution procedure before turning to detail.
The general solution procedure
As noted in the introduction, there are three relevant qualities or quality intervals, with q 1 < q 2 < q 3 . Construction occurs at the endogenous construction quality q 3 . Steady-state housing occurs in the lowest quality
Housing is downgraded with zero maintenance from construction to steady-state quality in the intermediate interval q 2 ,q 3 ( ).
Our solution procedure entails a constructive, algorithmic approach. We fix q 3 , solve for equilibrium conditional on q 3 , and then check whether the solution satisfies a remaining equilibrium condition. If it does not, we adjust q 3 and try again.
While the determination of equilibrium entails the simultaneous solution of a system of equations, it aids conceptualization to think of the solution proceeding recursively. The solution steps are as follows:
1. The rent at the construction quality q 3 is solved for on the basis of the construction technology.
The characterization of equilibrium in the downgrading interval is the most difficult part of the solution. Today there must be N housing units of quality less than q 3 . And the quantity of such housing units must be increasing at the rate n . Since no housing is demolished, and since no housing of quality below q 3 is constructed, the rate of housing construction at q 3 , which is also the rate at which housing filters down from the construction quality into the downgrading interval, must be nNe nt , for any value of t, including negative values.
2. Knowing this and the rate of deterioration of housing, solve for H q ( ) in the downgrading interval, and then solve for h q ( ) and y q ( ). The remaining equilibrium condition is that zero profits must be made. The construction quality q 3 is adjusted until this condition is satisfied.
6.2
The maintenance and construction technologies A simple maintenance technology is used that leads to bang-bang control. The rate of quality deterioration of a housing unit is given bẏ
where α and δ are constant parameters and m represents maintenance expenditures per unit of time. Thus, g m = 1 α and g q = −δ . If m = 0, the quality of a housing unit deteriorates exogenously over time at a constant exponential rate, δ . If m = αδq, the quality of a housing unit remains constant over time, and if m > αδq, quality upgrading occurs. Note also that, with this technology, an instantaneous spike of maintenance costing α increases quality by one unit. Thus, α is the marginal maintenance cost of quality.
Construction costs for a new housing unit are assumed proportional to construction quality. Thus, the construction cost function is
where ρ , the marginal construction cost of quality, is a constant parameter.
It is assumed throughout the paper that
This parameter restriction assures that it is cheaper to build a new housing unit at quality q than to build a new unit at quality 0 and instantly upgrade it to quality q through maintenance expenditures; the construction technology is cheaper than the maintenance technology. This can be compared to the housing technology of Henderson (1977) , which has α = ρ , as discussed in the Appendix of Arnott, Davidson, and Pines (1983) and fn. 4.
The phase diagram
Consider now panel III of Figure 5 . Substituting (20) into (2), it is seen
Maximizing this with respect to n shows that
which can be compared to (3). This is an example of bang-bang control.
The q = 0 locus, which is found by substituting these values of m q,φ ( ) into (20) and (5), is thus the horizontal line φ = α . Above this locus, m is infinite, and q is positive and infinite. Below this locus, m is 0 and q = −δq.
Along this locus, m is indeterminate, and q is also indeterminate (perhaps 0).
From (20) and (6), it is clear thaṫ
Thus the q = 0 locus has the equation
where ′ p q ( ) is endogenously determined by the interaction between the demand side of the market (Section 5) and the supply side of the market (this section). Above this locus φ > 0, and below this locus φ < 0. Recall (from Section 4) that the optimal trajectory for a housing unit follows the path AS, and the housing unit then spends the rest of its life in the interval S ′ S .
6.4
Rents at construction quality and in the steady-state interval Recall the analysis above and the phase diagram for the model in Fig.   5 , panel III. Since the marginal cost of quality via maintenance exceeds the marginal value of quality in the downgrading interval, the landlord-builder spends nothing on maintenance until she has run her unit down to its steadystate quality, at which point she spends that amount on maintenance required to keep her housing unit's quality constant.
Consider a landlord who builds a housing unit at quality q 3 (at time 0), lets it deteriorate without maintenance to quality q 2 , and then maintains the unit at quality q 2 forever afterwards. This corresponds to the trajectory AS in Figure 5 , panel III. Then, using (20),
The present discounted value of the landowner's profits are therefore (using (21) and (23a) - (24b)) π q 3 ,q 2
Maximizing π with respect to q 3 shows, after some tedious algebra and calculus, that
Competition from other landlords forces π down to 0. After incorporation of this condition, (26) reduces to
which states that, at construction quality, since maintenance expenditures are zero, rent should cover amortized construction costs plus depreciation. Thus, as claimed earlier, rent at construction quality depends on the construction technology. Maximizing π with respect to q 2 shows that
Rearranging slightly yields
The following argument provides an intuitive derivation of (28). At q 2 , the landlord is indifferent between letting the unit deteriorate without maintenance for an interval dt and then holding its quality constant, or holding its quality constant. The former strategy results in an immediate saving of αδqdt , but during the time interval the housing depreciates by δqdt units of quality, which reduces the present value of rents by We have completed step 1, which is determination of rent at the construction quality (see (27)).
We have noted previously that the rate of housing filtering from the construction quality to the downgrading interval at time t, designated by
for any value of t, including negative values. Since housing in the downgrading interval deteriorates exponentially at the rate δ , the housing at some quality q ∈ q 2 ,q 3
[ ] at time 0 filtered down from the construction interval at t = 1 δ ( )ln3 ( )<0. Thus, using (29) , the quantity of housing at time 0 between q and q 3 in this interval is
Hence h q
Then y q ( ) for the downgrading interval is determined from (15), or from (16) and the boundary condition (17b). This completes step 2 of the procedure.
Consider now the rent function p q ( ). Recall that the first-order condition of the individual's maximization problem is given by (19). Equation (19) holds for all q , and y q ( ) is known for the downgrading interval. Thus p q ( ) can be solved by using (19), which is a first-order ordinary differential equation, plus the boundary condition (27). Thus, apart from the boundary condition, rents in the downgrading interval are demand-determined, depending on tastes and the distribution of income. We have now determined p q ( ) over the downgrading interval. This completes step 3 of the procedure.
Equilibrium in the steady-state interval
Step 4 is to solve for q 2 . Since the argument below (28) applies for both
Thus, q 2 occurs where the slope of the rent function in the downgrading interval is r + δ ( )α. It is quite possible that, solving (19) backwards with boundary condition (27), there would be more than one quality for which ′ p q ( ) = r + δ ( )α. When this occurs, only the highest quality satisfying the equation is relevant. Otherwise, there would be qualities for which the marginal value of quality exceeds the marginal maintenance cost of quality and for which there was no maintenance, which is inconsistent with profit maximization.
Step 5 is straightforward. Since p q ( ) is continuous for all values of q ,
Since ′ p q ( ) and h q ( ) for this interval, and q 1 is simply determined using (18b) as
Even though the individual landlord is indifferent as to where in the steadystate interval his unit ends up, h q ( ) is determinate at the level of the market.
6.7
The final equilibrium condition Thus far in this section, we have solved for equilibrium conditional on q 3 . The construction quality q 3 is determined by the final equilibrium condition that zero profits be made on housing constructed at quality q 3 .
Since housing deteriorates at the rate δ in the downgrading interval, the present value of revenue from the period it is downgraded from q 3 to q 2 , discounted to the construction date, is
And (see (25)) since the discounted net revenue received from a housing unit after it falls to quality q 2 is 1 r
[ ] , the zero-profit condition (after changing the variable of integration) is
where q 2 and p q ( ) are functions of q 3 through the above procedure. 6
Algebraic Example
In this section, we develop an explicit algebraic example. In Section 8
we use this example for numerical simulation.
First, we assume a uniform distribution of income between the minimum income, y 0 , and the maximum income, y m . The function G y,t ( ), which represents the number of households with income greater than or equal to y at time t, is therefore
At time 0, the G y ( ) function of Section 5 is consequently
Second, we assume the Cobb-Douglas utility function
Thus, equation (5) becomes
which is a simple ordinary differential equation that can be used to determine p q ( ) once y q ( ) is known, or can be used to determine y q ( ) once p q ( ) is known.
Consider now the solution process outlined in Section 6. Suppose that the construction quality is q 3 . Then, from (27), the rent at this quality is
This completes step 1.
Consider the downgrading interval. We assume that n = δ . Equations (30) and (31) become
Thus, there is a uniform distribution of the housing stock over the downgrading interval. From (36) and (39), it is seen that y q
Hence, there is a linear relationship between income and housing quality over the downgrading interval. This completes step 2.
The rent function p q ( ) can now be determined over the downgrading interval. Equation (37) can be rewritten
This can be integrated as follows
Substituting (27), using (41), integrating the right-hand side, and rearranging, it is found that p q
for q 2 ≤ q ≤ q 3 , where p q 3 ( ) is given by (38). This completes step 3.
Consider the determination of q 2 . Differentiating (42), it is found that
for q 2 ≤ q ≤ q 3 , where p q 3 ( ) is given by (38). It is known from (28) that
Substituting q = q 2 into (43) and combining it with (44) allows the determination of q 2 , which can be done through an iterative procedure (holding q 3 fixed and iterating over q 2 ). This completes step 4.
Consider now the rent function and the other endogenous variables in the steady-state range. From (28) and the following discussion,
where q 2 is known from immediately above and p q 2 ( ) is found from (42).
From (37),
Substituting (45) into (46), it is seen that
Thus, there is a linear relationship between income and housing quality over the steady-state interval. Using (16), (36), (47), and g y
Hence, there is a uniform distribution of the housing stock over the steadystate interval. In order to determine the minimum quality, q 1 , it is necessary to use (18b) and (47), yielding
Equation (49) is easily solved for q 1 . This completes step 5.
The final step is to iterate over q 3 until the zero profit condition (35) is satisfied with (42) substituted into the integral for p q ( ). Eq. (35) is most easily integrated if we assume that r = 2δ .
Housing value as a function of quality can also be calculated (41)).
The function h q ( ) consists of a relatively high horizontal line segment from q 1 to q 2 (see (48)), and a lower horizontal line segment from q 2 to q 3 (see (40)). (42)).
The marginal rent function ′ p q ( ) is constant at the level r + δ ( )α from q 1 to q 2 , and monotonically decreasing from q 2 to q 3 . The average rent function p q ( ) q, which represents rent per unit of quality, is monotonically increasing from q 1 to q 2 , reaches its maximum somewhat above q 2 , and is monotonically decreasing thereafter, reaching the value r + δ ( )ρ at q 3 . The value function, V q ( ), is linearly increasing from q 1 to q 2 , with slope α , and when the phase plane has the configuration shown in Fig. 5 , panel III, increasing and concave from q 2 to q 3 .
INSERT FIGURE 7
The above procedure was based on the assumption that the equilibrium entails construction at a single quality, followed by downgrading to a steady-state interval. We need to check that our solution is indeed an equilibrium. Our solution procedure ensures that households are maximizing utility, taking the rent function as given. Thus, we need to show that with our solution procedure, at least for a restricted set of parameter values, landlords are maximizing profits, taking the rent function as given. To do this, we shall demonstrate that, for a subset of parameter values, the phase plane corresponding to our solution has the same configuration as that displayed in Figure 5 , panel III.
We need to demonstrate that: i) the φ = 0 line is negatively sloped for q > q 2 and for q < q 1 , and is flat for q ∈ q 1 ,q 2 ( ); ii) φ > 0 at the point ) .
iii) Next, we need to demonstrate that downgrading to the steady-state interval is more profitable than downgrading and abandonment. We have shown that this requires that H > 0 where the unstable arm meets either the q -or φ -axis, F . Now, p q ( ) for q < q 1 is the equilibrium bid-rent function for the household with income y 0 :
Also, where the unstable arm intersects the q -axis, q F solves These results can be explained through a combination of Figure 5 , panel III, and Figure 7 . Consider first the effect of the increase in α , with no change in q 3 . From (38) and (42), the increase in α has no effect on the upper portion of p q ( ) in Figure 7 , panel III. But it causes q 2 to fall (see (44)). This effect plus the direct effect of the increase of α on the rent gradient in the steady-state interval cause the rent function to fall everywhere in the steadystate interval and by more at lower qualities (since it now costs more to maintain a medium-quality house relative to a low-quality house). The effect on q 1 is ambiguous. This can be seen from Panel I. If q 2 falls a lot, q 1 must fall to restore equilibrium; if q 2 falls only a little, then q 1 rises due to the rise in α . All these changes were considered assuming no change in q 3 or p q 3 ( ). The increase in α reduces the profitability of the program. To restore zero profits, the rent gradient must shift up, which implies an increase in q 3 and p q 3 ( ).
Putting these results together explains the rise in rent at higher qualities, the fall in rent at lower qualities, as well as the expansion of the downgrading interval and the contraction of the steady-state interval.
Suppose that the government gives a subsidy to all maintenance expenditures. This corresponds to a decrease in α , which is the reverse of the paragraph immediately above. This has the desirable effect of increasing the housing quality consumption of low-income households, but the somewhat paradoxical effect of increasing the rent that they have to pay at any given quality.
Suppose that α increases to a significantly larger value, such as 1.5. Then the sort of equilibrium described in Sections 5-7 breaks down, since it becomes more profitable to let a housing unit deteriorate until its rent is 0 (and then abandon it) than to maintain it forever somewhere in the steadystate range between q 1 and q 2 .
Extensions
In this section, we consider one extension in detail --the treatment of a construction interval --and then discuss a variety of other extensions as topics for future research.
A construction interval
In the previous section, we focused on the case where there is a single construction quality, and we chose our example so that this is the equilibrium outcome. But, as noted earlier, depending particularly on the distribution of income, but also on the characteristics of the maintenance and construction technologies, construction may occur over a quality interval or over a set of quality intervals. In this subsection, we extend the analysis to the situation where there is a single construction interval.
Equilibrium in the class of models we are considering is efficient.
Intuition suggests that there should be construction over a single quality interval, at the top end of the market, when the income distribution is unimodal and has an attenuating right tail. In this situation, it would be inefficient to construct only luxury housing since only a small proportion of households would be willing to pay the premium for luxury housing required to make its construction profitable. At the same time, it would be inefficient to construct no luxury housing since there would be some rich households willing to pay the premium for it.
The extension to treat a single construction interval is, in fact, quite straightforward. Suppose that the construction interval extends from quality level q 3 to q 4 . Let b q ( ) denote the volume of construction at quality q for q ∈ q 3 ,q 4 ( ) per unit time. Over the interval, since φ = ρ < α (recall the phase diagram in panel IV of Figure 5 ), housing deteriorates without maintenance.
Eq. (27) applies for all qualities at which construction occurs. Hence, p q ( ) = r + δ ( )ρq for q ∈ q 3 ,q 4 ( ).
Since (19) holds for the richest household which resides in housing of quality
which gives an implicit equation for q 4 . Then over the construction interval, y q ( ) is solved from (19):
And from (16), h q ( ) over the construction interval can be solved for.
Let b q ( ) denote the volume of construction at time 0 and at quality q ∈ q 3 ,q 4 ( ). We wish to solve for b q ( ) knowing h q ( ). Now, the quantity of housing above quality q that was constructed at quality ′ q equals all the housing constructed at ′ q that has not yet filtered below q , and which therefore was constructed between time 
which can be compared to (29) and (30).
Thus,
where B 4 ≥ 0 is a construction bulge at q 4 (recall the discussion in Section 3).
Differentiation of (55a) yields
Differentiation of this equation with respect to q yields
We have assumed that construction occurs throughout the interval q 3 ,q 4 ( ). From (55c) , it follows that a necessary condition for this assumption to be valid is that the right hand side of (55c) be positive throughout this interval, which translates into a messy primitive condition on tastes, the distribution of income, n,δ ,r and ρ . 7
Since δq is filtering velocity, the amount of housing that filters from q 3 ,q 4 ( ) into the downgrading interval per unit time is h q 3 ( )δq 3 . Equilibrium requires that the amount of housing that filters from the construction interval to the downgrading interval per unit time is n 1 − H q 3 ( ) ( ) . Since q 3 is determined from (35), it would seem that the only way for these two conditions to be reconciled is for there to be a construction bulge at q 3 with mass
In Section 3, we argued that this construction bulge is always positive.
Observe that the method of construction of equilibrium, conditional on q 3 , which was outlined in Section 6, holds when there is a construction interval, except that the determination of y q ( ) is different (in particular, y q 4 ( ) = y m with a construction interval, while y q 3 ( ) = y m with a single construction quality). Since profit is the same (zero) at all qualities within the construction interval, (35) applies. This suggests a procedure that can be employed which determines endogenously whether there is construction at a single quality or over a single interval. Solve for q 3 per Section 6. Solve for q 4 7 This condition does not hold for the numerical example of Section 8. Suppose, to the contrary, that in that example there is an equilibrium with a construction interval. Then per (52) . If the q 4 so-computed exceeds the so-computed q 3 , proceed as outlined above. Otherwise, proceed as outlined in Section 6.
9.2
Directions for future research
In an earlier version of the paper we showed how the perturbation procedure used in Section 4 of Braid (1984) can be employed to derive the comparative static properties of the model. We chose to omit that analysis here for reasons of space, but it merits detailed treatment in a separate paper.
We conjecture, but have not proved, that it is possible to derive a constructive proof of the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium. One of the difficulties in constructing such a proof is the possibility that there is more than one construction interval. Another difficulty is the possibility that downgrading and then abandoning a unit may be more profitable than downgrading to a stationary quality.
The model could be extended analytically to provide a richer treatment of rehabilitation and maintenance, and of housing demand --for instance, distinguishing between housing quality and quantity. But, most interesting extensions would result in analytical intractability and would require numerical solution. For example, if land were incorporated into the model, the resulting equilibrium would not entail a steady state except in the fortuitous circumstance that the supply of land were to grow at the same rate as population. Thus, it appears that most subsequent work on models in the Sweeney tradition will require numerical solution. And any model that is sufficiently rich for practical policy analysis will certainly require numerical solution.
For policy analysis purposes, the concept of quality will have to be made operational. Should quality include location, unit size, neighborhood quality, public services, etc. or should these be treated as separate attributes of a housing unit? Once quality is defined in an operational way, housing quality will have to be measured, and the model will have to be parameterized. The most difficult aspect will be the parameterization of the maintenance and rehabilitation technologies, 8 since there are few data, very few studies which have attempted to estimate these technologies, and no studies which have employed a Sweeney-type model as the basis for estimation.
Conclusion
This paper has provided quite a thorough analysis of a model of a steady-state housing market similar to the Sweeney model except that it employs a particular maintenance technology which permits upgrading. In the Sweeney model, a housing unit is constructed, and then is continuously downgraded until eventual abandonment. In our model, a housing unit may follow such a path. But, depending on the characteristics of supply and demand, it may instead be held at a constant quality after being downgraded from its construction quality. Our model is of interest since, for some housing markets and submarkets at least, it provides a more realistic description of the market than does Sweeney's.
from which it follows that if g mq = 0 ( g mm < 0 by assumption), (using (iii) and (iv)).
Hence, a set of sufficient conditions for dφ dqφ = 0 < 0 is that g qm = 0, ′′ p < 0, g q < 0 , and g< 0. 
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